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Abstract
As we show using the notion of equilibrium in the theory of infinite sequential games, bubbles
and escalations are rational for economic and environmental agents, who believe in an infinite
world. This goes against a vision of a self regulating, wise and pacific economy in equilibrium.
In other words, in this context, equilibrium is not a synonymous of stability. We attempt to
draw from this statement methodological consequences and a new approach to economics. To
the mindware of economic agents (a concept due to cognitive psychology) we propose to add
coinduction to properly reason on infinite games. This way we refine the notion of rationality.
Keywords: economic game, infinite game, sequential game, bubble, escalation, microeco-
nomics, speculative bubble, induction, coinduction.
There is always some madness in love. But there is
also always some reason in madness.
Friedrich Nietzsche
Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1898)
Traders speculate with no limit, countries bankrupt, world consumes energy like crazy. Are our
models of a self-regulating economy, which rejects bubbles as unlikely, adapted? Are we sure to
understand how agents act?
The 2008 subprime crisis has shed light on two problems. One, the crisis is not due to mad
actors, but to the interaction of intelligent actors. Two, the current tools of economics, based on
concepts elaborated in the middle of the previous century are out of date.
Here we focus on a well known phenomenon, namely escalation1 whose rationality has been
questioned and even refuted as paradoxical. Escalation consists in taking with no limit a sequence of
decisions with heavier and heavier consequences. This headlong run strikes today the economy, the
finance and the social and environmental development and is a characteristic of financial bubbles.
This apparent irrationality has been illustrated by Newton after the emergence of one of the first
financial crisis, namely the South Sea Bubble when he said that “he could calculate the motions
of erratic bodies, but not the madness of a multitude”. In escalation, agents behave absolutely
rationally, provided they believe in the endless availability of natural or financial resources. Indeed
the trader or the investor is rational because he reasons in his own world which he thinks infinite,
1A well known phenomenon in the literature from Macbeth to Madame Bovary
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because he aims at maximizing his profits and because he believes that he can create money with
no limit. Amazingly a person involved in an escalation can bid indefinitely with no respect for
his loss. For an external observer, the decision taker implied in an escalation seems to have lost
his common sense, but from the point of view of the decision taker himself locked in his closed
world he is perfectly rational. The consistence of this attitude will be proved by a subtle and
correct reasoning on infiniteness. This level dependent perception is probably what distinguishes
instrumental rationality from epistemic rationality (see Section 9). Hence, an agent who captures
both internal and external vision and takes both into account is epistemicly rational whereas an
agent prisoner of the system is only instrumentally rational. The first agent will foresee the bubble
outburst, when the second agent will remain blind.
At last, we do not say that an escalation followed by a collapse which can be its consequence is
unavoidable, but we claim that it is plausible since escalation is supported by a rational behavior.
1 Toward new tools for analyzing systems
It is human nature to think wisely and to act absurdly
Anatole France
Le livre de mon ami
The book of my friend
In this article, we study systems with agents, where a system is an organization in which
elementary entities able to reason are called “agents”. In what follows, we use also the term
“player”, by analogy with games which we will use as our paradigm. According to its concern,
an agent takes decisions which are consequences of her preference or of her appreciation of what
she can gain. Of course, those choices influence the global behavior of the system. A behavior,
we are interested in, is an equilibrium, in which the decision of the agents are made in order to
maximise their returns. In that sense, equilibrium is synonymous of stability. But as we will show,
this can coincide with a quick evolution of the main parameters of the system,2 as for instance the
quick raising or decreasing of a price. Thus an equilibrium can yield a big instability of the main
parameters of the system, as this is the case in escalation, a concept we will focus on. Roughly
speaking we investigate sequences equilibrium-decision, equilibrium-decision, etc. and instability
can result as an outcome of these sequences. In infinite games, equilibrium is no more synonymous
of stability. This propensity of the agents toward optimization is what people call “rationality”, in
other words agents are gifted with a reason which they use for their advantage in their decisions.
But rationality has two faces, according to how it is viewed. Indeed it can be viewed from inside the
system or from outside, that is from a local or from a global perspective. These two points of view
lead to two opposite statements. Escalation which is specifically irrational from a holistic point of
view is rational from a reductionist one. This phenomenon raises many paradoxes. First a local
rationality, this of the agents taken individually, can result in a total irrationality when the system
is taken as a whole. Since the agent is squeezed in her world, it will be difficult for an external
observer to convince her of her mistake. When a observer affirms the rationality or the irrationality
of an agent he should tell at which level he stays. Second, a system founded on equilibria can be
2In general relativity, a black hole is the result of an equilibrium, whereas we know how extreme its behavior is.
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chaotic and a outburst can be a consequence of a sequence of equilibria. Therefore, the expression
“agents in equilibrium when taking decision” does not mean “a system with a slow and regular
evolution”.
Chaos and escalation are not well-understood in scientific disciplines (among others economics)
grounding part of their mathematical model on multi-agents systems. Therefore, we feel very close
to Jean-Philippe Bouchaud who claims that “Economics needs a scientific revolution” 3 or David
Colander who announces the end of the economics as we know it and calls for a refoundation. New
conceptual tools should be used, based on logic as developed by another science of large systems,
namely computer science, on top of which coinduction and coalgebras lie.
2 A case study: McDonald’s Restaurants vs Morris & Steel
Tell me what you eat, I tell you who you are.
Anthelme Brillat-Savarin,
La physiologie du gouˆt (The physiology of Taste)
An interesting case of escalation is this which opposed McDonald’s Corporation to two English
environmental activists, David Morris and Helen Steel 4 in the infamous so-called McLibel Trial,
also known as McDonald’s Restaurants v Morris & Steel. Clearly McDonald’s management has
a well-thought-out policy, knows how to argue and takes advice from the best lawyers. The trial
which latest ten years was the longest-running case in the English history. The facts started by
a small leaflet campaign, making allegations, not all asserted. Helped by the stars of the bar as-
sociation and firmly grounded on a supposed “credible threat” (see Section 8), namely that the
powerful MacDonald’s scares the activists and can support an endless case, the company suited the
activists for libel. Two of them, David Morris et Helen Steel, decided to defend their case. At the
end of a very long trial, the judge ruled mostly against the defendants, because some allegations
of the pamphlet could not be proved. But in retrospect the company lost. Specifically, the judge
ruled that McDonald’s endangered the health of their workers and customers by ”misleading ad-
vertising”, that they ”exploit children”, that they were ”culpably responsible” in the infliction of
unnecessary cruelty to animals, and that they were ”antipathetic” to unionization and paid their
workers low wages. This was evidenced in court by a media circus. Eventually, the defendants took
the case to the European Court of Human Rights who ruled against the British government because
UK laws had failed to protect the public right to criticize corporations whose business practices
affect people’s lives and the environment; they also ruled that the trial was biased because of the
defendants’ comparative lack of resources and what they believed were complex and oppressive
UK libel laws. Eventually the law was changed. It has been estimated that McDonald’s Company
has lost 10 000 000 £ with further consequence, when the activists spend 30 000 £, supported
by subscription and the compensation ruled by the European Court of Human Rights. This is a
typical case of escalation. Although the company saw that it was trapped and lost in image, it
could not be defeated in the court and kept arguing. It is interesting to notice that a preliminary
debate at the court was on the rationality of the decision process. The question was whether a
judge or a jury would take the case. The proposal of a jury was rejected because it was considered
more emotional whereas a judge was considered more rational.
3J-Ph. Bouchaud. Economics needs a scientific revolution. Nature, 455:1181, oct 2008.
4John Vidal, McLibel, Burger Culture on Trial, Macmillan Publishers, 1997
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3 Equilibria in games
In all escalation processes, there is an interaction–competition mechanism and competition prevails.
Early philosophers noticed that the rules that govern group activities are those of games, leading to
the development of game theory. Indeed like in an actual game, players cooperate more or less, but
overall they act for their own interest. Early on, the concept of game describes how the interaction
between the actors of a system works. This applies particularly to economics. The founding act of
game theory is John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern book, Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior, published in 1944.5
Jean-Jacques Rousseau tells in his Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality Among Men
(1775) how even acculturated men act collectively mixing interaction and selfishness. This leads
them to choose an option fitting with their best immediate interest. He chose the example of a
deer hunt which remains infamous.
“In this manner, men may have insensibly acquired some gross ideas of mutual under-
takings, and of the advantages of fulfilling them: that is, just so far as their present and
apparent interest was concerned: for they were perfect strangers to foresight, and were
so far from troubling themselves about the distant future, that they hardly thought of
the morrow. If a deer was to be taken, every one saw that, in order to succeed, he must
abide faithfully by his post: but if a hare happened to come within the reach of any one
of them, it is not to be doubted that he pursued it without scruple, and, having seized
his prey, cared very little, if by so doing he caused his companions to miss theirs.”
In this duality collective – individual involvement, the agent adopts a course of action from
which she has no interest to deviate. A strategic position, where individual behaviors are stuck
because agents do not change their choices is called an equilibrium. In his book Researches on
the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth (1838), the economist and mathematician
Antoine-Augustin Cournot evidenced in the case of duopoly this notion of equilibrium which has
not yet its name. Two companies compete for production of the same objects and try to adjust
their production to optimize their profits. A Cournot equilibrium is the optimum quantity which
companies must manufacture to earn the most money. One of the characteristics of Cournot
duopolies and Rousseau hunters is the interaction without cooperation. We will therefore focus on
non cooperative games, in which each player is selfish and does not attempt to help the others even
thought this may help her in the long term. Keeping the framework of non cooperative games, we
go from Antoine A. Cournot to John F. Nash, who in 1947 stated a general form of equilibrium
which one calls Nash equilibrium and which started an active research on non cooperative games.
These games are defined on a particular form of games which we call normal form games. They are
one shot game where payoff are immediately distributed. A typical example of normal form game
is the game stone-paper-scissors. Two players show at the same time one of the three following
objects, a stone, a paper or scissors. The rules are as follows:
• paper beats stone,
• stone beats scissors,
5The first paper on game theory is usually attributed to Ernst Zermelo and entitled “U¨ber eine Anwendung der
Mengenlehre auf die Theorie des Schachspiels’ ’, in the Proceedings of the Fifth International Congress of Mathe-
maticians (1913).
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• scissors beat papers.
In this game each player must randomize her choices and her optimum strategy is to play 1/3
paper, 1/3 stone and 1/3 scissors. The game matching pennies is a simplified version of the game
stone-paper-scissors. Two players whom we call Alice and Bob display at the same time a coin,
head or tail.
• If both players display heads or both players display tails, Alice wins.
• If both players display mismatching pennies, Bob wins.
Again players must play head and tail with equal probability. We will not extend on this type
of games, because there is too much emphasis given to the value of the payoff, which is at the core
of probability and we claim that the actors play without quantifying their gains. We are interested
by sequential games with no probability, as proposed by Harold Kuhn in 1953, following Zermelo.
In what follows values attributed to players will be symbolic. No computations are required, only
comparisons.
4 Sequential games
In a sequential game, players play several runs, each player at her turn. The distribution of the
payoffs takes place at the end of the game. In these games, there are many kinds of equilibria, but
those we are interested in are the so-called backward equilibria, since they translate the rationality
of the choices of the players. They are called “backward” since they compute backward from the
end of the game. Without loss of generality, we consider only two player games. For instance,
consider a variant of the game matching pennies, where this time, players Alice and Bob play one
after the other. More precisely, Alice plays first, then Bob, then Alice again. In case of a matching,
two heads in a row or two tails in a row, Alice wins the set. In the other case Alice looses her sets.
The scores are accumulated and counted at the end of the game. We count the global win, loss or
tie which corresponds respectively as w, ` or t. For instance, if Alice plays head, then Bob plays
tail, and Alice plays head, there is no matching, then Alice globally looses and Bob globally wins,
resulting in `. If Alice plays head, Bob plays tail and Alice plays tail, there is a global tie for both
resulting in t.
This games has an almost obvious winning strategy, but we consider it only as an illustration,
in order to show that we must consider even the most stupid strategies, according to the coun-
terfactuality.6 Very naturally this game is presented by the diagram of Figure 1 where Alice is
identified by A and Bob is identified by B and where arrows are the steps of the game. Label h of
an arrow shows that the player plays head, whereas label t shows that player plays tail. Remind
that the value of the payoffs has no meaning but the fact that they can be compared. Thus 0 < 1
and 1 < 2. Number 0 means that player never won, number 1 means that player won as often as
her opponent and number 2 means that player won twice more that her opponent.
On the diagram, each player has two choices: either to go down (head) or to go right (tail).
Starting at the leftmost uppermost node, following the arrow labeled h, then the arrow labeled t,
then the arrow labeled h, one gets to the end of the game. The tag ` means “Alice globally looses
and Bob globally wins”. Let us call h t h such a strategy profile.
6A reasoning is counterfactual if it relies on hypotheses which are not necessarily plausible. “If there are Martians,
they try to communicate with us”.
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Figure 1: The matching pennies sequential game, where A starts, then B plays, then A plays again.
In this game, among the eight strategy profiles, two are equilibria (Figure 2). Thus in the
strategy profile h t t which leads to t if Bob changes his choice in h, then Alice would chance her
choice in h and he would loose, therefore he would not do it. The computation of such an equilibrium
requires what specialists call a backward induction. Let us consider a position in the game and let
us look at positions which come after (following the arrows). If we consider this configuration, we
see that it is itself a game (a subgame) completely included in the game of Figure 1. The idea is to
attribute to each subgame a couple of payoffs which corresponds to what the equilibrium returns.
To associate these couples one starts from the end of the game and one goes back to the start of the
game. Step by step, one builds the assignments of the payoffs for the subgames. We start from the
ends of the game, then we build slightly larger games, then still larger, to get to the largest game,
that is the game we are interested in. In other words, we build equilibria gradually. At each step,
we choose for the player of interest, the larger payoff and we remember the choice. The equilibrium
is the strategy profile which goes through the taken positions.
Characteristics of the analysis of sequential games is counterfactuality. We reason in all situa-
tions as they would be possible. Clearly, some game positions, located after one player has chosen
another option will not take place, but they must be taken into account to explain how the play-
ers reason. Counterfactuality plays an even more important role in infinite games so crucial in
escalation.
Which link between backward equilibria and rationality? Robert Aumann, Nobel Prize
winner in economics in 2005, has shown in 1995 that backward equilibria are rational strategy
profiles. They are strategy profiles in which everybody knows that nobody can change her choices
without loosing or drawing and everybody knows that rationally no other case can appear. We say
that the players choose these equilibria from a common knowledge of the rationality of the other
players.
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Figure 2: The two equilibria of the matching pennies. The double arrows correspond to choices
made by players
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5 0, 1 Games
Vulnerant omnes
Ultima necat
Sentence disposed on sundials,
We will focus on simple sequential games. In these games, players have choices to leave (`) or
to continue (c). The payoffs are 0¤ ou 1¤ 7 Let us focus on the game with seven players.
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• At the last turn, Alice must of course choose c, since she earns 1¤.
• At the penultimate turn, Bob may choose, what a choice! Indeed, if he continues he earns
nothing and if he leaves he earns nothing as well.
• At the fifth turn, Alice continues because in each case, she earns 1¤. And if she leaves she
earns nothing at all.
• At the fourth turn, Bob has the same choice as at the penultimate turn, namely to earn
nothing or to earn nothing.
• At the third turn, Alice continues.
• At the second turn, Bob must choose between nothing or nothing.
• At the beginning of the game, Alice should do nothing by stop
The 0, 1 game has seven turns and more than one rational strategy profile. They all have the
characteristics that Alice always continues and Bob does whatever he wants. Let us consider now
the 0, 1 game with six turns.
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This time the backward induction yields something different.
• At the last turn, Bob continues.
7To spice up the game, we could replace 1¤ by 1 000 000 000¤ and therefore say that the players either receive
nothing or receives a billion of euros. We insist on the fact that the quantity does not count, only counts the
comparison.
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• At the penultimate and fifth turn, Alice does whatever she wants.
• At the fourth turn, Bob continues.
• At the third turn, Alice does whatever she wants.
• Etc.
Here is the diagram of the game where Alice leaves always.
A
c **
`

B
c &.
`
		
A
c **
`

B
c &.
`
		
A
c **
`

B
c '/
`
		
0, 1
0, 1 1, 0 0, 1 1, 0 0, 1 1, 0
In this game, and in all 0, 1 games with an even number of turns, the rational strategy profiles,
that are the equilibria, are when Bob continues always and Alice does whatever she wants. We will
look at infinite 0, 1 games and see what the equilibria in those games are.
6 The dollar auction
both
Walk toward each other and the duel starts again
Then by degrees in its dark dementia
The battle intoxicates them; then come to their heart back
This I don’t know which god who wants that one is a winner.
Victor Hugo,
La Le´gende des sie`cles. Le mariage de Roland
Honi soit qui mal y pense
King Edward III,
Motto of the Order of the Garter
The dollar auction game has been described by Martin Shubik8 in 1971 and it is well known
in France under the name American auction. There it is made in some weddings and it consists
in selling the garter of the bride, the products of the sale helps the couple for their honeymoon or
for their settlement. In his version Shubik sales through an auction one dollar and the goal is to
collect much more than the price of the object. The dollar auction consists in selling the object
(the dollar) as follows. Each time a person bids for n ¤, she must put the given amount in a hat
and this amount is never returned to her. As Shubik wrote it is suggested to wait for starting the
auction that “the spirits are high”, as it is the case at the end of a wedding party and we can limit
ourself to two bidders, because this does not change the phenomenon. Actually in most of the cases,
8M. Shubik, The dollar auction game: A paradox in noncooperative behavior and escalation. Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 15(1):109–111, 1971.
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even though it starts with more than two bidders and an increment of 1 ¤, the auction ends with
two bidders who do not want to give up. Then one notices an escalation phenomenon. The bidders
are going to pay more than the value of the object and more than what they wanted to invest at
the beginning. They keep fighting in order to acquire the garter or the George Washington bill.
Actually they have invested so much that they do not want to give up without getting the desired
object.
In Shubik analysis and in this of his successor, we see two contradictory statements:
• To have escalation, the game must be infinite. More precisely, Shubik writes that “the anal-
ysis is confined to a (possibly infinite) game without a termination point, as no particular
phenomenon occurs if an upper bound is introduced”.
• Shubik and his followers analyze finite games, then extrapolate their results to infinite games.
From that, they conclude that the only equilibrium is this where no player starts the auction
and never bids. They claim that the rational player would reject at any price any type of escalation.
We have shown that this strategy profile is not an equilibrium in the dollar auction. To extrapolate
finite games to infinite games, as Shubik and those who have adopted his reasoning do, is wrong.
We will come back on it later.
7 The infinite sequential games : back to the 0, 1 game
He walks on the immense plain
Goes ahead, comes back, throws the grain further up
Reopens his hand, and starts again,
And I meditate, obscur witness.
Victor Hugo,
Saison des semailles. Le soir
In 0, 1 games we have limited the number of turns. But nothing prohibits to consider infinitely
many turns.
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What are the equilibria in this case? One can no more define the equilibria by backward
induction, but we can use a similar method9 which assumes that we reason on infinite objects. Let
us call it backward coinduction. Actually there are at least two equilibria:
1. Alice leaves always and Bob continues always (Figure 3),
2. Alice continues always and Bob leaves always (Figure 4).
9The specialists following Selten (1965) speak of subgame perfect equilibria, but we propose to call them backward
coinduction equilibria.
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Figure 3: Alice leaves always and Bob continues always.
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Figure 4: Alice continues always and Bob continues always.
Justification This paragraph can be skipped at first reading. Let us see why and how this works. Let us
recall how we proceeded in the case of finite games. Starting of end games, we examine a game position.
There are a player and two subgames of which we know at least an equilibrium: we choose as an equilibrium
for the whole game the one that corresponds to the player making the choice of the best of the two equilibria.
Now let us go to infiniteness and let us show that the strategy profile where Alice always leaves and Bob
always continues is an equilibrium. Like in the case of the backward induction, we know the equilibria for
the subgames. In the case where it is Bob’s turn, what are the equilibria? There are two, one is Bob’s
abandon and in the other, where Bob continues, one has a sub-equilibrium in which Alice starts. What is the
equilibrium where Alice starts? This is the same as this we are looking for, namely the strategy profile where
Alice always leaves and Bob always continues. Among the optimal strategy profiles available to Bob, which
one is the best? This where Bob continues, since Alice abandons and he wins 1¤, wherever if he would leave,
he would earn nothing. Hence the good choice, which yields the equilibrium, is this where Bob continues,
then Alice leaves always, then Bob continues always. In the case of Alice’s turn, a similar reasoning shows
that an equilibrium is this where Alice always leaves and Bob always continues. Let us summarize: We have
shown that if one makes the hypothesis that the equilibrium is the strategy profile where Alice always leaves
and Bob always continues then the equilibrium is the strategy profile where Alice always leaves and Bob
always continues. This a bit sophisticated explanation may be better understood on Figure 5 where we have
represented the game 0, 1 more compactly. Are we cycling? No! Our reasoning is perfectly correct, because
the hypothesis is on strict subgames. Let us call it backward coinduction: induction comes from the noun
induction and the prefix co, “associated”, and backward insists on the analogy with backward induction.
Actually we have shown that the strategy profile where Alice leaves always and Bob continues always is an
equilibrium all the game along. We say that this is an “invariant” of the infinite game.
The same kind of reasoning applies to the dollar auction. This is slightly more complex, since
the invariant is not the same strategy profile, but the same parametrized strategy profile to take
into account the fact that the involved numbers increase. Then there are at least two equilibria in
the dollar auction: one for Alice continuing always and Bob leaving always and the other for the
other way around.
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Figure 5: The 0, 1 game and its equilibria seen compactly
8 Escalation is rational
Irrational exuberance has unduly escalated asset values.
Alan Greenspan,
Federal Reserve Board Chairman, on May 12 1996
We know equilibria of the 0, 1 game, but how this may lead to escalation? Assume that our
players or economic actors are rational, but have no memory and no ability to reconsider their choice.
They forget immediately and learn nothing from past. They know how to analyze a situation and
understand their interest, but they do not know how to take advantage from their experience, they
do not see themselves reasoning and they have no reflection on their own reasoning. Moreover they
do not take into account the marginal fees and they do not see a moving society. In short they
are introvert and forgetful. At each step of the 0, 1 game, Alice starts a new infinite 0, 1-game.
She knows she has two possible rational strategies. The first strategy consists in continuing today,
tomorrow, the day after tomorrow and always, assuming that Bob will leave always. In this second
strategy, she takes very seriously the resolution of Bob to continue always. This is sometime called
a credible threat, which is the attitude of Morris and Steel’s friends10 in front of MacDonald’s. Alice
will continue if she thinks that she impressed enough Bob to scare him and make him to abandon
always. This is MacDonald’s attitude all along the case against Morris and Steel. “This is not
possible. They are going to give up” thought MacDonald’s board. If we are in a situation where
no one takes seriously the threat of the other, no threat is credible, we are in an escalation.
Let us recall two characteristics of escalation. Like in any sequential game, only comparisons11
are pertinent. Agents handle entities that are completely abstract: they do not know the value
of what they handle. They know only how entities are compared. Moreover, agents are faced at
each step to two (or more) options equally rational, therefore the evolution of the process is highly
unpredictable. At this level exogenous influences on the decision process may happen. Since Alice
has no objective reason to choose between “continuing” or “leaving”, she can take into consideration
emotional aspects12 or invoke other rational criteria.
10Among five pamphlet distributors, only Morris and Steel fought back MacDonald’s.
11In any case, using probabilities, assuming we know on what it applies, would not add anything of the prescription
in successive choices.
12Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011.
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9 Escalation and cognitive psychology
It is worth wondering whether agents are really rational. Take for this the view of cognitive
psychology as describe in Keith E. StanovichWhat Intelligence Tests Miss: the psychology of rational
thought.13 A rational agent owns a mindware made of rules, knowledge and procedures which he
can retrieve in her memory and which she acquired by a mental training and/or by education and
which allows her to make decision and to solve problem. Of course we assume that the mindware
of the agents we consider contents coinductive reasoning tools or all types of equivalent reasonings
which allows conducting correct deductions on infinite mathematical objects.14
There are two kinds of rationality from the coarser one to the finer one. On one side the
instrumental rationality allows the agent to behave appropriately among the world so that she
gets what she wishes, using her physical and mental resources. The economists and the cognitive
scientists refined the notion of wished goal to this of expected utility. The epistemic rationality
lies above instrumental rationality and interacts with it. It allows the agent to confront her set of
beliefs to the effective structure of the world. We would say that it makes the agent able to think
about her own way of reasoning. More conventionally, we would say that the epistemic rationality
deals with what is true, whereas instrumental rationality deals with actions to maximize aims. The
first form of rationality corresponds to algorithmic mind and the second one to reflexive mind. A
reflexive mind is able to analyze how she reasons.
We claim that an escalating agent owns a correct algorithmic mind, but meanwhile she lacks
a reflexive mind which would allow her, by revising her belief, specifically her belief in an infinite
resource, to escape from the escalation spiral. Indeed at the beginning such a belief gives her
dynamism for investing, but as the adage says “Errare humanum est, perseverare diabolicum”.
Therefore there is a time when a rational agent must understand that a belief in an infinite resource
leads her to a dead end and that her judgement must be revised. Doing so, early enough, the agent
shows that she is really rational.
10 The ubiquity of escalation
She bought ostrich feathers, Chinese porcelain, and trunks;
she borrowed from Fe´licite´, from Madame Lefranc¸ois, from
the landlady at the Croix-Rouge, from everybody, no matter
where. With the money she at last received from Barneville
she paid two bills; the other fifteen hundred francs fell due.
She renewed the bills, and thus it was continually.
Gustave Flaubert
Madame Bovary
Escalation is a very frequent phenomena as soon as participants are rational and consider infinite
resources. In some cases this is what people look for, because this is a survival condition, like in the
13Yale University Press 2010. One can also read Antonio Damasio Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the
Human Brain, Putnam, 1994
14Stanovich seems to not be aware of coinduction and therefore considers escalation as dysrational in his mindware.
Nevertheless his distinction between instrumental and epistemic rationality remains operational.
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case of evolutive biology. In his Red Queen theory Leigh Van Valen describes the competition of
two species and the survival condition of each species that results, namely a continual adaptation
to fight the challenge of the species. Escalation is not a drawback, but a positive quality that makes
the species perennial when it has a challenger. In another hand, in economy, we know perfectly
well the consequence of escalation, namely speculative bubbles with huge devastations when they
blow up.
Figure 6: Evolution of world energy consumption (source Wikipedia)
Development theory says that earth provides us with a finite amount of fossil energies and the
sun light is a limited resource as well. Therefore the increasing of energy consumption (Figure 6)
is a frightening escalation.
In another field, escalation is a consubstantial component of war. From the Bear Hall Putsch
to his suicide, through Mein Kampf publication and Stalingrad battle, Hitler’s trajectory is an
escalation. Locally and in isolation, Hitler has displayed a strategic rationality, i.e., an instrumental
rationality.
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11 It is not possible to extrapolate
One morning we set sail, with brains on fire,
And hearts swelled up with rancorous emotion,
Balancing, to the rhythm of its lyre,
Our infinite upon the finite ocean.
...
We want, this fire so burns our brain tissue,
To drown in the abyss – heaven or hell, who cares?
Through the unknown, we’ll find the new.
Charles Baudelaire
Le voyage (Travel)
In Section 7, we saw that the reasoning mistake of Shubik and mostly of his followers was to
prune away an infinite branch of an infinite game to make finite games, then to reason on finite
games, then to extrapolate the results obtained on the finite games to the infinite game. We have
seen that on the 0, 1 game this method cannot work: according to the fact one prunes away at an
even step or at an odd step the results are different and there is no natural way to extrapolate.
In the case of the dollar auction, the problem is more vicious since the results look consistent on
the different size of infinite games. However it may depend on the way the cut is done. What
is wrong in the extrapolation has been well identified by the mathematician Weierstrass in 1871:
what we know on the finite does not foretell what we can say on the infinite. More precisely, he
has proved that a well known and classical property of finite sums of functions (to be differentiable
everywhere and to be associated with smooth curves), disappears for infinite sums of functions
(which can be nowhere differentiable and be associated with especially rough curves). This result
was a surprise when it has been published, since great mathematicians before him admitted without
proof the persistence at infinity of the differentiability. Moreover, this evidenced the existence of
monster curves without tangents, which have been systematically studied by Mandelbrot as fractals
(Figure 11). Actually this mistake on extrapolation goes back to Zeno of Elea, who stated that
Achilles would never overtake the tortoise. This led to negate motion. Indeed Zeno extrapolated
the true result on one run that Achille does not overtake the tortoise, because he started after the
tortoise and reached the point where the tortoise started. There are infinitely many such runs.
Zeno is wrong when he extrapolates his result, true on one run, to the limit of the infinite sequence
of runs. He should not conclude that Achille will not overtake the tortoise.
Let us consider another example, namely a recent and easy to understand mathematical result,
founded on concepts known from Pythagoras and Euclid. An arithmetic progression is a sequence
obtained from some initial term by adding always the same common difference. The sequence
5, 8, 11, 14, 17, ... is an arithmetic progression of common difference 3. There exists no infinite
arithmetic progression made only of primer numbers.15 Ben Green and Terence Tao have proved
15A prime number is a number divisible by the two numbers 1 and itself. If the origin of the progression is n and
its common difference is d, then the (n + 1)th element is n + n× d is clearly not prime, because it is divisible by n.
15
in 2004 that there exist arbitrary long finite arithmetic progressions made only of prime numbers.
This difficult result deserved Tao the Fields medal. We face clearly a result that is not extrapolable.
The very specific interest of this result is that the finite case is incommensurably more difficult that
the infinite case. We were more used to the opposite case, namely when the finite case is easier
than the infinite case which requires the subtle coinduction.
12 Conclusion
By a precise analysis of the infinite, we have shown that agents involved in an escalation are (instru-
mentally) rational. Consequently, any approach that affirms too fast that they are irrational16 has
missed the right argument based on a coinductive analysis of infinite games. The use of coinduction
and more generally of reasonings on infinite objects should be part of the new foundation of eco-
nomics or as cognitive psychology scientists would say, coinduction must be part of the mindware
of the economists. In this framework, equilibrium will not be paired with stability.
On another hand the internal rationality of the agent should be made distinct from the external
rationality of the observer. The agent who stipulates an infinite availability of resource is introvert.
She sees only her own short term interest and lacks of “reflection”. She is not able or she is not
willing to imagine a global analysis, whereas the observer sees immediately the behavioral aberration
of the system. Each one has his own rationality and the points of view cannot be reconciled.
16We do not deny they are party irrational. Indeed bewildered, they can invoke irrational arguments to raise
perplexity.
Figure 7: The Julia set, with a bound which is a tangentless curve
16
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